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If the 'Hydrogen Economy' is to progress, more hydrogen fuelling stations are required. In
the short term and in the absence of a hydrogen distribution network, these fuelling sta-
tions will have to be supplied by liquid hydrogen (LH2) road tankers. Such a development
will increase the number of tanker offloading operations significantly and these may need
to be performed in close proximity to the general public.
The aim of this work was to determine the hazards and severity of a realistic ignited
spill of LH2 focussing on; flammability limits of an LH2 vapour cloud, flame speeds through
an LH2 vapour cloud and subsequent radiative heat levels after ignition. The experimental
findings presented are split into three phenomena; jet-fires in high and low wind condi-
tions, 'burn-back' of ignited clouds and secondary explosions7 post 'burn-back'. An attempt
was made to estimate the magnitude of an explosion that occurred during one of the re-
leases. The resulting data were used to propose safety distances for LH2 offloading facilities
which will help to update and develop guidance for codes and standards.
Crown Copyright © 2014, Hydrogen Energy Publications, LLC. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All
rights reserved.Introduction
The 'Hydrogen Economy' is gathering pace internationally and
now in the UK. Over the last year a number of vehicle related
demonstration projects have appeared, linked to the 2012
Olympics.Whilst in the longterm, thekey to thedevelopmentof
ahydrogeneconomy is a full infrastructure to support it, a short
bridging option for hydrogen refuelling stations particularly, is
the bulk storage and transport of cryogenic hydrogen, referred
to in industry as LH2. Although cryogenic liquid storage has
been used safely for many years in secure and regulated in-
dustrial sites, its use in relatively congested highly populated
urban areas presents a new set of problems in relation to000.
ov.uk (J.E. Hall), philip.ho
1
Energy Publications, LLCsecurity, safetyandassociatedplanning.There ispreviouswork
undertaken by NASA on LH2 relating to its spill behaviour [1],
but this was performed in a low humidity desert environment.
Research is therefore needed to identify and address issues
relating to bulk LH2 storage facilities associatedwith hydrogen
refuelling stations located in urban environments so that
further guidance on their safe management can be developed.
Issues in particular relating to LH2 include: flame speed,
ignition behaviour as a cool/dense vapour and the complica-
tions of this associated with layering effects, LH2's low boiling
point and associated ability to condense out and even solidify
oxygen from air to produce a potentially hypergolic mixture of
LH2 and liquid or solid oxygen.oker@hsl.gsi.gov.uk (P. Hooker), deborah.willoughby@hsl.gsi.gov.
. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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During 2009e2011 Royle and Willoughby performed experi-
ments on large-scale un-ignited releases of LH2 [2] with the
aim of determining the range of hazards from a realistic
release of LH2.
The work involved releasing LH2 at fixed conditions of
1 barg in the tanker through 20m of 1” n.b. hose, which gave a
rate of 60 L per minute for differing durations. The release
height and orientation were varied and the sensor positions
were changed.
Aims of investigation into ignited releases
This series of experiments followed on from the un-ignited
experimental results (summarised above) to establish the
severity of an ignition from a release of LH2 with comparable
spill rates, consistent with a transfer hose operation.
A number of distinct areas relating to an ignition were
investigated: flammable extent of a vapour cloud; flame
speeds through a vapour cloud; radiative heat levels generated
during ignition.Experimental set up
The facility was situated at the Frith Valley site at the Health
and Safety Laboratory in Buxton.
Release facility
The LH2 release system comprised the 2.5 tonne capacity LH2
tanker, 20 m of 1” n.b. vacuum insulated hose, a release valve
station with bypass purge and release valves, an LH2 bypass
hose and a 6 m high vent stack to vent excess hydrogen.
On receipt of delivery, the hydrogen within the tanker was
normally at around 4 bar pressure and as such it was super-
heated relative to its atmospheric boiling point of 20 K. In
order to achieve a liquid spill of the contents at atmospheric
pressure without excessive flash vaporisation, the tanker was
first depressurised to atmospheric pressure by venting
hydrogen from the vapour space above the liquid, thereby
cooling the remaining LH2 within the tanker to its atmo-
spheric boiling point. Some LH2 was then allowed to flow into
the hydrogen/air heat exchanger where it vaporised re-
pressurised the LH2 such that it would flow out of the tanker
at a nominal flow rate (60 l/min).
Additionally for these ignited trials, a metal shield
1.26 m  1.6 m was fitted to protect the release point from fire
or overpressure damage.
Instrumentation
During the tests the following measurements were made:
flammable extent and flame speed; radiative heat (six fast
response ellipsoidal radiometers); meteorological measure-
ment. To ignite the hydrogen vapour cloud 1 kJ Sobbe chem-
ical igniters were used at four positions on the test pad. The
optimum positions for the igniters were established using
concentration data taken from previous un-ignited tests.Results
Fourteen tests were performed in total, of which four were
non-ignitions. The reason for the non-ignitions is not clear;
it may be that the gas cloud was under or over-rich in
hydrogen at the point that the igniters were fired due to
differing dispersion and wind effects, or a quenching effect
was created by the water vapour created by the cold hydrogen
cloud.
During the test programme the ignition delay was varied
between ~60 and ~320 s. The longer tests allowed for a larger
build-up of flammable cloud and also reproduced the liquid/
solid pooling phenomena first seen during un-ignited releases
of LH2 [2]. The extent of the flammable cloud appeared to be
congruent with the visible extent of the water vapour cloud
created by the very cold hydrogen cloud when IR footage was
compared with visible footage. The flame speeds were
measured for each test from the high-speed video and found
to develop from 25 m/s up to 50 m/s with increasing release
duration.
On one occasion, as the cloud was ignited; it burnt back to
source creating a jet-fire and then a secondary explosion
appeared to emanate from the liquid/solid pool location. The
separate phases of the burning cloud are highlighted in the
radiometer plot from the test, shown Fig. 1. The first peak on
the plot represents the initial deflagration of the cloud back to
the release point or 'burn-back'; the second larger peak rep-
resents the secondary explosion and the longer radiative
phase after represents the resulting jet-fire. The varying plot
levels correspond to the six radiometers located at increasing
distances from the release point.Secondary explosion
The secondary explosion occurred close to the release point
after the LH2 had been released at ground level, during windy
conditions, for 258 s without significant pre-cooling of the
concrete. The explosion occurred after the hydrogen cloud
had been ignited, burned back to the release point and then
burned steadily for 3.6 s. From IR video footage, the explosion
was estimated to be of a hemispherical profile and approxi-
mately 8 m in diameter, emanating 2.5 m from the release
point, corresponding with the location of the solid/liquid pool
seen prior to ignition.
Several attempts were made to reproduce this phenome-
non without success, although the conditions on subsequent
occasions were far less windy, with the wind in the opposite
direction. It is possible that oxygen enrichment of the
condensed air may have occurred due to oxygen's higher
boiling temperature (90.19 K) than nitrogen (77.36 K), an effect
that may have been more likely during the windy conditions.
It is postulated that the explosion was either a gas phase ex-
plosion resulting from a sudden release of oxygen from the
solid due to a rapid phase change, or even a rapid reaction
within the condensed slurry of solidified air and LH2 if the
oxygen concentration were high enough [1]. Unfortunately, at
the time of the explosion no pressure measurements were
being made. Therefore, it was necessary to estimate the “size”
of the explosion by other means.
Fig. 1 e Radiometer readings from ignited release exhibiting a secondary explosion (Test C).
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As no over-pressure measurements were made at the time of
secondary explosion, an estimate of the TNT equivalent en-
ergy (derived by one of two methods, below) was used to
determine the magnitude of the explosion over-pressure. A
blast-modelling program was then used to process this
TNT equivalent to provide a visual representation of the
pressure.
Method 1 e pressure effects
The explosion failed to break the Perspex windows in the
small cabin approximately 20 m from the centre of the ex-
plosion. Knowing the material composition of the window
(Perspex) and the distance from the epicentre, it is possible to
input this data into the Hazl model to estimate the TNT
equivalent required to break a window of comparable di-
mensions. Themodelling program used does not contain data
for Perspex specifically and cannot be readily altered to
include it; however, an assessment of the upper limit can be
made for Polycarbonate, which is stronger than Perspex.
The program calculated that the minimum required TNT
equivalent was 4.01 kg for Polycarbonate. From this estimate a
TNT equivalent of <4 kg can be assumed for the explosion. If
the hydrogen were to act like a condensed phase explosive i.e.
all of the hydrogen is used to generate the blast wave, then
this would equate to <150 g of hydrogen yielding approxi-
mately 18 MJ.
Method 2 e radiative fraction
Another method of estimating the size of the secondary ex-
plosion is to use the radiometer data and relate it to the
radiative fraction.
The radiative fraction depends upon the fuel type and
whether contaminants are present within the burning cloud.
Hydrogen flames typically radiate less than flames from the
combustion of hydrocarbon gases. The radiative fraction was
estimated for the steady burning periods of the LH2 release
experiments.It is common toapproximate the radiative fractionof aflame
based on radiometer readings taken at a significant distance
from the flame such that an inverse square law can be reason-
ably applied. However, in this case the flame was elongated
along the line of the radiometers andwas generally close to the
ground. It can be seen that the readings of the first three radi-
ometers are very similar to each other (Fig. 1). This would be
expected from the flame shape observed on the video re-
cordings. For this reason, a semi-cylindrical radiating heat
sourcewasassumedfor thepurposesofestimating theradiative
fractionandthetotal radiatedheatestimatedusingEquation (1).
Qr ¼ ð1þ aÞpdLq2 (1)
where:Qre heat radiated, kW; de distance to radiometer,m; L
e length of flame, m; q e heat flux at radiometer, kW/m2; a e
reflection coefficient of concrete surface below the flame.
Data from two of the ignited releases were analysed in this
way, assuming a reflection coefficient for the concrete of 0.55
[3], giving an estimate of the radiative fraction as 0.054. This
estimate compares reasonably well with previously reported
values for gaseous and LH2 hydrogen releases [4,5].
Using the radiative fraction above and the radiometer
response during the secondary explosion, another estimate
for secondary explosion size can bemade. Since the explosion
almost engulfed the nearest radiometers, the estimate is
based on the furthest radiometer and a hemispherical heat
flux. It was also assumed that the radiative fraction during the
explosion was similar to that during steady burning. On this
basis the quantity of hydrogen rapidly burned in the explosion
was estimated as 675 g, yielding approximately 82 MJ. This
would equate to approximately 18 kg of TNT which is
considerably higher than the upper limit suggested by the
pressure effects discussed in Section Method 1 e pressure
effects. This may be attributed to the explosion yield of the
hydrogenmass being less than 100%. It has been reported that
hydrogen explosions with a particular energy content would
cause less damage at a given distance than amass of TNTwith
the same energy content [6,7].
Table 1 e Burn severity vs. thermal dose relationship.
Harm caused IR radiation thermal dose (TDU)
Mean Range
Pain 92 86e103 [9]
Threshold e 1st degree burn 105 80e130 [10,11]
Threshold e 2nd degree burn 290 240e350 [9,10,12]
Threshold e 3rd degree burn 1000 860e2600 [10]
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The use of Polycarbonate (4 kg TNT) in method 1 is conser-
vative as no windows in the shed were broken. The next
closest approximation available in Hazl is annealed glass
which would require 2.7 kg TNT to break. Assuming 2.7 kg of
TNT as a closer approximation, this value was taken as the
input condition for modelling the secondary explosion using
blast program Air3D [8]. Air3D is an open source code devel-
oped to simulate three dimensional air-flows in a heteroge-
neous, anisotropic zone. The predicted maximum over-
pressures from the model are 16 kPa (13 m from source),
28 kPa (10 m) and 73 kPa (7 m) respectively.Thermal dose safety distances
The level of harm caused by thermal radiation can be assessed
by considering the level of radiation experienced and the
period of time for which this radiation level is tolerated. This
can be expressed in 'thermal dose units' (TDUs).
By taking the heat flux data from the radiometers used
during testing it is possible to assess the potential thermal
dose caused by an ignition of LH2. The radiometers measure
radiation from the IR region and thus IR burn data have beenFig. 2 e Thermal dose vs. exposure timeused for comparison. Table 1 shows the thermal dose levels
for several harm (burn) criteria.
It is of note that the burning of hydrogen releases signifi-
cant quantities of ultra-violet (UV) radiation compared with
hydrocarbon-based fires of a similar size. However, the dosage
of UV radiation must be more than twice the IR dosage to
cause similar injury levels [11]. Therefore the effects of UV
radiation have been excluded and IR radiation assumed to be
the dominant cause of harm. By applying the average dose
levels for the different 'harm' levels (shown in Table 1) to the
heat flux datameasured experimentally by the radiometers, it
is possible to determine the time taken to reach a given harm
threshold at a given distance. This technique can be applied to
infer approximate safety distances for the four ignited re-
gimes seen during testing:
1. A steady state jet-fire during high wind >0.6 m/s.
2. A steady state jet-fire during low wind <0.6 m/s.
3. The initial deflagration or 'burn-back' of the release cloud to
source.
4. The secondary explosion seen after the initial deflagration.
Due to the nature of the regimes above, they can be
grouped further. Both the initial deflagration and the sec-
ondary explosion are events that occur within a known,
comparatively short (ms) timeframe. This is in comparison
with the high and low wind speed jet-fires, which can be
approximated to a continuous event, lasting for longer periods
(minutes). Therefore, the deflagration and explosion are
reviewed separately from the jet-fires.Jet-fire thermal safety distances
A 'no harm' criterion for jet-fires has been established at
1.6 kW/m2 [13]. This is the heat flux level at which no
discomfort will be felt regardless of exposure time. In order toduring high wind conditions (Test A).
Fig. 3 e Thermal dose vs. exposure time during low wind conditions (Test B).
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 0 5 4 7e2 0 5 5 3 20551find the base heat radiation level for a hydrogen jet-fire, the
initial peak due to burn back was discounted until a steady
state level was achieved. This steady state level was then
averaged for the individual radiometers to create heat fluxes
at known distances from the flame extent. The flame extent
was equated to a 5 m long, hemi-cylindrical shape emanating
from the LH2 release point.
Two tests were chosen to compare jet-fires in high and low
wind conditions: Tests A and B respectively. These particular
tests were chosen as they had good data sets at extremes of
wind condition (Test A: 2.15 m/s; Test B: 0.59 m/s), whilst both
having thesameSouthWesterlywinddirection. Fig. 2 andFig. 3
show thermal dose against exposure time at a range of dis-
tances from the flameextentwith variousharm levels overlaid
for high and low wind speed conditions respectively. The dis-
tances shown on the graphs represent the distances of the
individual radiometers from the flame extent of the jet-fire.Fig. 4 e Thermal dose vs. distance from relevant flame extentThe results from these two tests indicate that at separation
distances greater than 8.7 m a person will not receive a
harmful thermal dose regardless of exposure time. However,
at distances closer than 7.6 m from the flame extent, a person
would expect to experience ‘pain’ after 28 s and 44 s for high
and low wind speed conditions respectively. This equates to
approximately half the exposure time between a calm and
windy day when closer than 7.6 m from the flame extent, or
12.6 m from the release point if the 5 m long jet-fire was
directly towards you.
Initial deflagration/secondary explosion thermal safety
distances
The only data set that contained both an initial deflagration
and then a secondary explosion was Test C. The flammable
cloud extent and epicentre of the secondary explosion havefor initial deflagration and secondary explosion (Test C).
Table 2 e Safety distance guide for thermal effects for a 60 l/min spill.
Initial cloud
deflagration
Secondary
explosion
Jet-fire
(high wind)
Jet-fire
(low wind)
Minimum separation distance from source to avoid 'pain' (m) >11.1 >11.3 12.6 > 13.7 12.6 > 13.7
Exposure time (s) 0 0 ∞ ∞
Note: these values consider radiative heat only, not pressure effects.
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accordingly.
The flame extent for the 'burn-back' was equated to a 9 m
long, hemi-cylindrical shape emanating from the LH2 release
point. From IR footage of the test, it is clear that the greatest
intensity of burning occurs when the flame approaches the
source at a distance of approximately 3 m (close to the sec-
ondary explosion source). Therefore, it is preferable to assume
a smaller flame extent to take into account the lower intensity
of flame seen at distances between 3 and 9 m.
The flame extent for the secondary explosion was equated
to an 8 m diameter hemisphere emanating from a point
source 2.5 m from the release point on a centreline, in line
with the release.
As the initial deflagration and secondary explosion are
finite and relatively short events in comparison with a
continuous jet-fire, the thermal dose for these phenomena
can be plotted as a function of distance from the flame extent.
The assumption is made that a person would be unable to
escape the event and would experience the total heat flux
from the phenomena at a given distance instantly. A plot of
heat flux against distance for Test C is shown in Fig. 4.Conclusions
From experimentation, four separate regimes have been
found to occur when a full bore failure of a 1” liquid (60 l/min)
hydrogen tanker transfer hose is ignited:
 An initial deflagration of the cloud back to source, travel-
ling at speeds up to 50 m/s;
 A possible secondary explosion emanating from the solid
deposit generated after the initial deflagration of the
release cloud due to oxygen enrichment. Estimated to have
an equivalent energy of up to 4 kg of TNT;Fig. 5 e Scale drawing of flammable extent and minimum sepa
explosion and jet-fire. A buoyancy driven jet-fire when wind conditions are
minimal (wind speeds< 0.6m/s), with flame speeds> 25m/
s;
 Amomentumdominated jet-firewhenwind conditions are
high (wind speeds > 0.6 m/s), with flame speeds > 50 m/s.
From radiometer data recorded during testing, it has been
possible to estimate safety distances for the different release
phenomena associated with a full bore failure of an LH2 refu-
elling hose (Table 2). In order to do this, different assumptions
have been made for the different phenomena based on visual
information from the testing and previous work on harm
criteria and TDU levels. It must be pointed out that the safety
distances described below are for IR radiation only and do not
consider any potential pressure effects which may require
greater distances. The distances represent the minimum
separation distance required for an individual to stand from
the release point (rupture point) to avoid feeling ‘pain’. These
safety distances are calculated by adding the separation dis-
tances from theflameextent (Figs. 2e4) to themaximumflame
extents for each phenomenon. This therefore describes the
worst case distance from a person to an ignited LH2 hose
rupture point, illustrated in Fig. 5 with the LH2 release point
taken as the centre point for the separation distances.
The safety distance guide values for the four different
phenomena are very similar (11 > 14 m) (Table 2). This simi-
larity in the case of the initial deflagration and secondary
explosion is coincidental. Intuitively, one might expect the
secondary explosion to have a larger separation distance as it
has a greater peak heat flux, however, the initial deflagration
is comparatively a far longer event and thus commands a
greater separation distance The distances of 12.6 > 13.7 m for
the jet-fires is linked to the positioning of the instrumentation
but is based on exposure time at that distance. These sepa-
ration distances relate to the hydrogen flow rate of 60 l/min
and cannot be assumed or extrapolated for different flowration distances for the initial deflagration, secondary
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information presented in this paper are based on limited data
and thus are estimates.r e f e r e n c e s
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